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Participants: 32 preschoolers (mean = 4;2, range 3;6 - 4;8)
Between-subjects design:
Results:  In both Draw and Pretend conditions, children said 
that the ignorant actor drew or pretended to be the rabbit that 
she knew about; when she knew about both rabbits, children 
were at chance.
Question:  Will 4-year-olds use an actor’s knowledge when 
naming a drawing or an act of pretense?
Experiment 1:  Knowledge
Who do you think this is a 
picture of – Alex or Sasha?
Jessica sees, pets Sasha
CONTROL conditionIGNORANT condition
Jessica sees, pets Alex
Marco has two new pets: Sasha and Alex!
DRAW condition PRETEND condition
Who do you think she’s pretending 
to be – Alex or Sasha?
Introduction
Drawing and pretense are representational acts, 
dependent on the artist’s or actor’s mental 
representations.  Do preschoolers understand the 
mental components of these acts?  The two studies 
presented here explore children’s sensitivity to an 
actor’s mental states when interpreting the 
outcome of the representational acts of drawing 
and pretense.
Experiment 1:  Knowledge
At a minimum, the artist or pretender must know 
about the object that they’re drawing or 
pretending to be.  Some researchers find that 4-
year-olds do not  consider the agent’s knowledge: 
children say an artist is drawing a snake even 
though she’s never seen one, or that an actor is 
pretending to be a monkey even though he doesn’t 
know about monkeys (Richert & Lillard, 2002; 
German & Leslie, 2001).  Others have found that 
children are sensitive to the pretender’s knowledge 
state (e.g., Aronson & Golomb, 1999; Davis, 
Woolley & Bruell, 2002), though drawing has not 
been further studied.
Experiment 1 explores this question further, to 
examine whether children will take into account an 
actor’s knowledge state in drawing and pretense.
Experiment 2:  Belief
Do preschoolers consider an artist’s false beliefs 
when interpreting her drawing?  There is some 
evidence that they do: in Robinson, Riggs & 
Samuel (1996), children considered their own 
false belief when naming their own drawings 
based on that belief, and Peterson (2002) found 
that when given an unexpected contents false 
belief task, 4-year-olds could correctly identify 
which of two pictures (the expected or true 
contents) an ignorant artist would draw. 
In these studies, children were given unambiguous 
drawings.  Experiment 2 pursues this question 
further, by presenting 4-year-olds with the more 
difficult task of naming an ambiguous drawing 
based on a false belief generated by an unexpected 
contents situation.
Conclusions
In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were sensitive to the 
ignorance of the actor, naming her drawing or 
pretense according to her knowledge.  These findings 
add to increasing evidence that studies such as Richert
and Lillard (2002) underestimate preschoolers’
abilities, not only in pretense but also in drawing.
In Experiment 2, preschoolers showed a sensitivity to 
the artist’s false belief when naming a drawing based 
on that belief.  Though they were not able to correctly 
identify the drawing better than chance, children did 
not systematically err by naming the picture according 
to the true contents.
In this experiment, children were better at naming the 
drawing based on a false belief than they were at 
identifying the false belief itself.  Peterson (2002) 
found a similar difference with a group of older 4-
year-olds: when asked to choose which drawing 
correctly reflected an artist’s belief, children performed 
better than when asked in a standard false belief 
format.  This incongruity requires further study.  It 
may arise out of a difference between implicit and 
explicit measures of false belief understanding, or may 
be due to other factors.  
Together, the findings from these two experiments 
indicate that 4-year-olds take into account the mental 
states of the artist or pretender, and suggest that they 
appreciate the mental underpinnings of these types of 
representational acts.
Preschoolers reason about mental states in drawing and pretense
Erika Nurmsoo, Yale University
Experiment 2:  THINK
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Participants:  12 preschoolers (mean = 3;10, range 3;0 - 4;7)
Results:  When the artist had a true belief, children 
correctly named the drawing.  When the artist had a false 
belief, children were at chance, but they did not attribute to 
her an intention to draw the true contents of the box. 
They made more errors when asked about the artist’s false 
belief itself than when asked to name her drawing based on 
that belief.
Question:  Will 4-year-olds use an artist’s false belief when 
naming a drawing?
Experiment 2:  Belief
Tom looks inside a Smarties box, finds pennies
Jessica sees the Smarties box, but doesn’t open it.  She 
says, “I’ll draw what’s inside the box!” Tom says, “me, too!”
Here’s Jessica’s picture!
What’s this a picture of?
Here’s Tom’s picture!  
What’s this a picture of?
What does Jessica think 
is inside the box?
What does Tom think is 
inside the box?
DRAW questions
THINK questions
Experiment 2:  DRAW
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False Belief
True Belief
Experiment 1:  Results
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